Desde los albores de la existencia humana, el sufrimiento, como constante antropológica, se ha constituido en una de las preocupaciones fundamentales de los hombres. Se le ha prestado atención constante, pero ello no ha de ser óbice para que no sigamos haciéndolo. La Filosofía puede contribuir a aportar luz a este concepto en nuestros días, en tanto en cuanto el problema del sufrimiento, a pesar de haber recibido respuestas muy distintas en las distintas épocas del pensar humano, parece persistir. Con (...) el presente artículo buscamos aproximarnos al concepto del sufrimiento desde la luz que aportan algunos de los paradigmas filosóficos relevantes, al objeto de identificar algunas aplicaciones prácticas que favorezcan una gestión de recursos humanos más adecuada, tanto desde un punto de vista ético, como desde el lado de la rentabilidad empresarial. Ofrecemos por tanto propuestas para una gestión de recursos humanos responsable, sostenible y eficiente, de la mano del pensamiento filosófico. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

El problema de la filosof a hisp nica concierne m s bien al car cter de la filosof a contempor nea en Hispanoam rica, es decir, a su ethos. "Parece como si no pudi ramos hacer filosof a en nuestro mundo hisp nico, -se ala Nicol en el prefacio- sin debatir previamente la cuesti n del car cter y estilo de lo que vamos a hacer y c mo adaptarlo al genio aut ctono y a los destinos de nuestra comunidad." (...) Tal preocupaci n es estudiada en este ensayo. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

I argue against Matthew Slater’s rejection of what he calls the grounding claim in his stable property cluster account of natural kinds. This claim states that the epistemic value of natural kinds depends on the existence of some ground to bind together a kind’s properties. Using two test cases from academic medicine, I show that grounds are genuinely explanatory of scientific epistemic practices and that the SPC account should not do without them in its philosophical analysis of natural kinds.

In this paper we develop a general representation theory for MV-algebras. We furnish the appropriate categorical background to study this problem. Our guide line is the theory of classifying topoi of coherent extensions of universal algebra theories. Our main result corresponds, in the case of MV-algebras and MV-chains, to the representation of commutative rings with unit as rings of global sections of sheaves of local rings. We prove that any MV-algebra is isomorphic to the MV-algebra of all global sections of (...) a sheaf of MV-chains on a compact topological space. This result is intimately related to McNaughton’s theorem, and we explain why our representation theorem can be viewed as a vast generalization of McNaughton’s theorem. In spite of the language used in this abstract, we have written this paper in the hope that it can be read by experts in MV-algebras but not in sheaf theory, and conversely. (shrink)

The paper surveys different notions of implicit definition. In particular, we offer an examination of a kind of definition commonly used in formal axiomatics, which in general terms is understood as providing a definition of the primitive terminology of an axiomatic theory. We argue that such “structural definitions” can be semantically understood in two different ways, namely as specifications of the meaning of the primitive terms of a theory and as definitions of higher-order mathematical concepts or structures. We analyze these (...) two conceptions of structural definition both in the history of modern axiomatics and in contemporary philosophical debates. Based on that, we give a systematic assessment of the underlying semantics of these two ways of understanding the definiens of such definitions, by considering alternative model-theoretic and inferential accounts of meaning. (shrink)

We respond to criticism of our paper “Paradox in Wave-Particle Duality for Non-Perturbative Measurements”. We disagree with Steuernagel’s derivation of the visibility of the Afshar experiment. To calculate the fringe visibility, Steuernagel utilizes two different experimental situations, i.e. the wire grid in the pattern minima and in the pattern maxima. In our assessment, this procedure cannot lead to the correct result for the complementarity properties of a wave-particle in one particular experimental set-up.

Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...) not block Armstrong’s solution. I argue that, in fact, the timeless necessity explanation is a better explanation of our observed regularities than is the time-limited necessity explanation. (shrink)

This article tries to delineate the proposition that to Feuerbach nature is an autonomous and independent being that comes first in comparison to the spirit. To him, material nature, that exists in its qualitative differentness, independent from thinking, is the original source, the immediate, not deductible, uncreated fundament of all real existence, that exists and consists in itself, when put vis-a-vis the spirit. Feuerbach sets nature against the spirit, for it is his understanding that nature is not a pure other (...) that only through the spirit was set as nature, but as the first source, the objective material reality that exists outside reason and is given to man by means of his senses as fundament and essence of his life. Therefore, one is dealing first with that essence (light, air, water, fire, plants, animals etc) without which man does not exist or could be thought of as existing. To Feuerbach nature is all objects and essences put together. Under this condition it is possible to conceive nature as guarantor of externality itself as if it could exist independently from us, an entity that is unaware of itself and which exists in itself and by itself; for this reason it shall not be seen as something which it is not, i.e., neither divine nor human. Nature always existed, i.e., it exists in itself and has only meaning in itself; it is itself, i.e., it has no mystical essence, it does not hide behind it any absolute being whether human, divine, transcendental or ideal. (shrink)

This paper provides a detailed study of David Hilbert’s axiomatization of the theory of plane area, in the classical monograph Foundation of Geometry. On the one hand, we offer a precise contextualization of this theory by considering it against its nineteenth-century geometrical background. Specifically, we examine some crucial steps in the emergence of the modern theory of geometrical equivalence. On the other hand, we analyze from a more conceptual perspective the significance of Hilbert’s theory of area for the foundational program (...) pursued in Foundations. We argue that this theory played a fundamental role in the general attempt to provide a new independent basis for Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, we contend that our examination proves relevant for understanding the requirement of “purity of the method” in the tradition of modern synthetic geometry. (shrink)

In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo’s construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that such formalization (...) shows that Yablo’s Paradox involves implicit circularity. In the same direction, Beall (2001) has introduced epistemic factors in this discussion. Even more, Priest has also argued that the introduction of infinitary reasoning would be of little help. Finally, one could reject definitions of circularity in term of fixed-point adopting non-well-founded set theory. Then, one could hold that the Yablo paradox and the Liar paradox share the same non-well-founded structure. So, if the latter is circular, the first is too. In all such cases, I survey Cook’s approach (2006, forthcoming) on those arguments for the charge of circularity. In the end, I present my position and summarize the discussion involved in this volume. En este artículo, describo y examino los principales resultados vinculados a la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética. Aunque es natural suponer que hay una representación correcta de la paradoja en la aritmética de primer orden, hay algunos resultados técnicos que hacen surgir dudas acerca de esta posibilidad. Más aún, presento algunos argumentos que han cuestionado que la construcción de Yablo no sea circular. Así, Priest (1997) ha argumentado que la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética de primer orden muestra que la misma involucra implícitamente circularidad. En la misma dirección, Beall (2001) ha introducido factores epistémicos en esta discusión. Más aún, Priest ha también argumentado que la introducción de razonamiento infinitario como complemento de la formalización en la aritmética sería de poca ayuda. Finalmente, se podría rechazar todo intento de dar definiciones de circularidad en términos de puntos fijos adoptando teoría de conjuntos infundados. Entonces, se podría sostener que la paradoja de Yablo y la del mentiroso comparten la misma estructura infundada. Por eso, si la última es circular, también lo es la primera. En todos los casos, presento el enfoque de Roy Cook (2006, en prensa) sobre estos argumentos que atribuyen circularidad a la construcción de Yablo. En el final, presento mi posición y un breve resumen de la discusión involucrada en este volumen. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in the (...) sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)

This essay urges us to complement work on the philosophy and social science of race that has focused on the “visual” and “epistemic” dimension of racism with work on affect or what is here called the somatological dimensions of racism. The racist self hears race before he sees it. The racist self is convulsed by race before she experiences it as an epistemic affair. It is argued here that we dwell in the sound house of race. Before racism is chromocratic, (...) it is phonocratic. The technologies of the racist self are the technologies of racializing aurality and phonology. Racism brands us sonically. Race, it will be argued, is a sonic stigmata. More specifically, the focus will be on voice, accent, what here is called the prosody of race. The aim is make those racialized and racializing accents in philosophy resound, echo, and reverberate so that we can hear the prosody of race. The racist does not dwell in the silent chamber of the mind’s “I.” The viscera of racism dwells in the body our racist habits have domesticated. (shrink)

State of the art paper on the topic realism/anti-realism. The first part of the paper elucidates the notions of existence and independence of the metaphysical characterization of the realism/anti-realism dispute. The second part of the paper presents a critical taxonomy of the most important positions and doctrines in the contemporary literature on the domains of science and mathematics: scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, constructive empiricism, structural realism, mathematical Platonism, mathematical indispensability, mathematical empiricism, intuitionism, mathematical fictionalism and second philosophy.

The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the historical debate between materialism and idealism, in the field of Philosophy, extends, in new clothes, to the field of Quantum Physics characterized by realism and anti-realism. For this, we opted for a debate, also historical, between the realism of Albert Einstein, for whom reality exists regardless of the existence of the knowing subject, and Niels Bohr, for whom we do not have access to the ultimate reality of the matter, unless (...) conditioning it to the existence of an observer endowed with rationality, position adopted in the Interpretation of Complementarity – posture that was expanded in 1935 when Bohr assumed a “relationalist” conception, according to which the quantum state is defined by the relationship between the quantum object and the entire measuring device. This is an extremely important debate, as it further consolidates the results of nascent Quantum Mechanics, guaranteeing Bohr the leadership of the orthodoxy based on the interpretation of complementarity. Here, when dealing with Quantum Theory, we will not make any distinction between the terms Quantum Physics, Quantum Theory or Quantum Mechanics. The entire discussion will be held under the name “Quantum Theory”. Theory that tries to analyze and describe the behavior of physical systems of reduced dimensions, close to the sizes of molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. We hope that the reader will appreciate the genius of these two titans in this field of Physics when they magnificently formulate the arguments that support the object of their defenses. (shrink)

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turned contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

Darwin used artificial selection extensively and variedly in his theorizing. Darwin used ASN as an analogy to natural selection; he compared artificial to natural varieties, hereditary variation in nature to that in the breeding farm; and he also compared the overall effectiveness of the two processes. Most historians and philosophers of biology have argued that ASN worked as an analogical field in Darwin’s theorizing. I will argue rather that this provides a limited and somewhat muddled view of Darwinian science. I (...) say “limited” because I will show that Darwin also used ASN as a complex experimental field. And I say “muddled” because, if we concentrate on the analogical role exclusively, we conceive Darwinian science as rather disconnected from contemporary conceptions of “good science”.I will argue that ASN should be conceived as a multifaceted experiment. As a traditional experiment, ASN established the efficacy of Darwin’s preferred cause: natural selection. As a non-traditional experiment, ASN disclosed the nature of a crucial element in Darwin’s evolutionary mechanics: the nature of hereditary variation. Finally, I will argue that the experiment conception should help us make sense of Darwin’s comments regarding the “monstrous” nature of domestic breeds_traditionally considered to be problematic. (shrink)

Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

State of art paper on the topic causation, around the problem of the nature of causation. Central theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, namely, regularity theories of Hume and Mackie, counterfactual theories of Lewis, probabilistic theories of Reichenbach, Lewis and Menzies and causal processes theories of Salmon and Dowe.

State of art paper on the topic laws of nature, around the problem of identification what is to be a law of nature. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: the simple regularity theory, from Hume; the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best systems theory; the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of laws as relations among universals; Ellis’s essentialist theory; Cartwright’s theory of laws as ceteris paribus laws; the anti-reductionist theories of Lange, Maudlin and Carroll, the anti-realist theories of Mumford, (...) van Fraassen and Giere; etc. (shrink)

This work-in-progress aims to explain as accurately as possible the philosophical meaning given by Wittgenstein to the silence in both of his major books, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the Philosophical Investigations. REMARKS ARE WELL RECEIVED.

RESUMO: Não há, no pensamento de Marx, uma elaboração sistemática acerca da religião, embora haja uma crítica a ela enquanto crítica social das condições materiais de existência, que é o fundamento dela. Para Marx, a religião, entendida especificamente como superstição, idolatria, “ópio”, a qual conforma o homem e embaraça a sua consciência, deve ser negada, mas não se trata pura e simplesmente de um desprezo, de uma proibição ou perseguição à religião, nem tampouco de uma negação em geral a ela, (...) uma vez que ela é uma questão privada e deve ser respeitada, mas de desvelar o véu religioso presente na sociedade e no seu ordenamento político, no Estado, que oculta a exploração e a opressão humana. A crítica à religião como crítica da realidade social, da qual ela nasce e é expressão ideal, contribui, de certa forma, para a emancipação social do homem. ABSTRACT: it is not to be found in Marx’s thought a systematic elaboration concerning religion, although there is indeed a critical appraisal of it as a result from his social critique of material conditions of human existence which is its foundation. In Marx’s perception, religion is understood specifically as superstition, idolatry, “opiate”, something that pushes man to accommodation and twists his conscience, and as such should be dismissed, this act being not, however, a mere refusal, prohibition or persecution, or a wide negation of it, considering that it is a private issue and as such should be respected, but as an effort to cast off the religious veil covering society and its political ordainment commanded by the State, and hides exploitation and oppression of human beings. Critique of religion as an evaluation of social reality, from which religion derives, is an ideal proposition that to a certain extension contributes to the social emancipation of men. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the theory of area developed by Euclid in the Elements and its modern reinterpretation in Hilbert’s influential monograph Foundations of Geometry. Particular attention is bestowed upon the role that two specific principles play in these theories, namely the famous common notion 5 and the geometrical proposition known as De Zolt’s postulate. On the one hand, we argue that an adequate elucidation of how these two principles are conceptually related in the theories of Euclid and Hilbert is highly (...) relevant for a better understanding of the respective geometrical practices. On the other hand, we claim that these conceptual relations unveil interesting issues between the two main contemporary approaches to the study of area of plane rectilinear figures, i.e., the geometrical approach consisting in the geometrical theory of equivalence and the metrical approach based on the notion of measure of area. Finally, in an appendix logical relations among equivalence, comparison and addition of magnitudes are examined schematically in an abstract setting. (shrink)

El Libro de Arena, de J. L. Borges imagina un libro poblado de infinitas páginas. Esta infinidad se manifiesta de varias formas, cada una de las cuales puede ser asimilada con alguna propiedad de los conjuntos numéricos. Exploraremos dicha similitud y veremos emerger el Libro de Arena como un símbolo complejo, pero no autónomo. En efecto, no sólo el libro y sus páginas, sino asimismo los personajes y cada elemento puesto en escena se articulan en el desarrollo del relato y (...) allí pierden su apariencia de objetos para revelarse como funciones en la producción del sentido final. (shrink)

Las «metáforas», «analogías» o «alegorías» tienen un lugar bien ganado en la tradición filosófica. Han sido atacadas por dar lugar a una interpretación poco rigurosa de las nociones que describen, pues permite asociarles propiedades que originalmente no se había pensado (ni resulta deseable) que formen parte de su concepto. Sin embargo, a pesar del reclamo en favor de procedimientos estrictos de definición, el uso de una imagen apropiada suele ser el mejor modo de explicar esas cuestiones que cada siglo escapan (...) a la disección que el filo de las mejores definiciones pretendía darle. Tal es el caso de las ilustraciones usadas por Charles S. Peirce en sus artículos "Algunas consecuencias de cuatro incapacidades" y "Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas" para dar cuenta del pensamiento. Primero veremos el papel que juegan estas imágenes en la argumentación conque Peirce establece dos principios importantes de su filosofía: el de que toda cognición se encuentra determinada por otras cogniciones previas, y el de que no tenemos ningún poder de introspección. Luego hallaremos que dos de las imágenes presentan cierta incompatibilidad en un aspecto especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista de lo que tratan de ilustrar. Para finalizar, consideraremos una explicación que sea consistente con los textos y que permita resolver la discrepancia, brindando una mejor comprensión conjunta de ambas ilustraciones . (shrink)

Resumo: Este estudo analisa as narrativas radiofônicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma e conteúdo através do qual o autor buscou proporcionar para a infância de seu tempo uma possibilidade de experiência com o contemporâneo. Ao se pensar as peças do ponto de vista didático e do ponto de vista da aprendizagem, pode-se encontrar nelas a intencionalidade de Benjamin, bem como a atenção e o cuidado dado por ele a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para o esclarecimento como Aufklärung, no cotidiano prosaico das (...) massas. Esse cuidado o levou a questionar, a exercitar e a experimentar a transmissão do conhecimento por meios novos e metodologias inovadoras para a época, sem perder de vista a perspectiva dos vencidos, em sua batalha diária, ou seja, em seu cotidiano. As peças, portanto, não são modelos apenas em sua estrutura narrativa, mas também de uma intencionalidade pedagógica emancipadora que pode dialogar com a criança, mediante a ludo-linguagem de domínio e fluência das crianças. A infância, nesse sentido, é signo de uma nova subjetividade fortalecida e, assim, capaz de resistir e de se desviar dos encantos e das promessas do populismo fascista que, no século XXI, não deixou de rondar a todos. Palavras-chave: Narrativas Radiofônicas; Experiência; Walter Benjamin Radiophone tales: the emergency of a modern form of narration in Benjamin Abstract: This study analyzes Walter Benjamin's radio narratives as a form and content through which the author sought to provide the childhood of his time with a possibility of experiencing the contemporary. Whenever thinking about the pieces from the didactic point of view and from the learning point of view, it could find Benjamin's intentionality among it, as well as the attention and care given by him to elements apparently irrelevant to the clarification, such as Aufklärung, in the prosaic daily life of masses. This care led him to question, exercise and experiment with the transmission of knowledge through new means and innovative methodologies for the time, without losing sight of the perspective of the losers, in their daily battle, that is, in their daily lives. The plays, therefore, are not models only in their narrative structure, but also of an emancipatory pedagogical intentionality that can dialogue with the child, through the ludo-language of mastery and fluency of children. Childhood, in this sense, is a sign of a new, strengthened subjectivity and, consequently, capable of resisting and deviating from the charms and promises of fascist populism that, in the 21st century, did not cease to haunt everyone. Keywords: Radio Narratives; Experience; Walter Benjamin Cuentos radiofónicos: la emergencia de una forma moderna de narración en Benjamin Resumén: Este estudio analiza las narrativas radiofónicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma y contenido a través del cual el autor buscó proporcionar para la infancia de su tiempo una posibilidad de experiencia con lo contemporáneo. Al pensar en las piezas, desde el punto de vista didáctico y desde el punto de vista del aprendizaje, se puede encontrar en ellas la intencionalidad de Benjamin, así como la atención y el cuidado dado por él a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para el esclarecimiento como Aufklärung, en el prosaico diario de las masas. Ese cuidado lo llevó a cuestionar, a ejercitar y a experimentar la transmisión del conocimiento por medios nuevos y metodologías innovadoras para la época, sin perder de vista la perspectiva de los vencidos, en su batalla diaria, o sea, en su cotidiano. Las piezas, por lo tanto, no son modelos solo en su estructura narrativa, sino también de una intencionalidad pedagógica emancipadora que puede dialogar con el niño, mediante el Ludo lenguaje de dominio y fluidez de los niños. La infancia, en ese sentido, es signo de una nueva subjetividad fortalecida y, así, capaz de resistir y de desviarse de los encantos y de las promesas del populismo fascista que, en el siglo XXI, no dejó de rondar a todos. Palabras clave: Narrativas Radiofónicas; Experiencia; Walter Benjamin Data de registro: 07/03/2023 Data de aceite: 22/11/2023. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza’s philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity (...) to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link—not always noticed in the secondary literature—with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion. (shrink)

This article takes up the work of Bottici, Cornell, and Perez in order to expand on Lugones's inchoate notion of a decolonial feminist imaginary. The claim is that decolonial feminism is also the elaboration of a decolonial feminist imaginary that challenges the colonial/modern imaginary of global capitalism. The article also takes up Lugones's critique of Mignolo's notion of “colonial difference,” which is found to be incoherent and even dangerous.

Esta sección temática constituye la segunda discusión sobre el desafío de la adopción de reglas lógicas publicado en Análisis Filosófico. Al igual que la primera, esta colección de artículos puede verse como el resultado de la colaboración internacional que durante más de dos décadas hemos mantenido entre el Saul Kripke Center (SKC) y el IIF-SADAF-CONICET. Y más precisamente, entre Saul, Romina y el grupo de lógica de Buenos Aires (BA-Logic). Visitas, seminarios, workshops, proyectos internacionales, y fundamentalmente mucho afecto y pasión (...) por los problemas filosóficos fundamentales han marcado este proceso. Tanto Romina como Saul han apoyado sistemáticamente los esfuerzos desde Argentina para producir conocimiento en el área de lógica. Ambos han estado involucrados no solo institucionalmente en el apoyo al desarrollo de nuestro grupo, sino también a nivel personal. Fueron muchos los momentos que compartimos juntos. Muchos recuerdos e historias. Es importante destacar, solo para mencionar un simple aspecto de nuestras historias comunes, que Saul participó activamente en el proceso de elaboración de la propuesta de ambos números, en la lectura de gran parte del material, e incluso como réferi de algunos trabajos. Saul y Romina asistieron por Zoom a varias reuniones en el marco de los seminarios que generaron parte del material aquí publicado. Recuerdo la alegría de Saul, sus comentarios y la sorpresa de muchos de los participantes de ver aparecer en sus pantallas al filósofo más importante del mundo y uno de los más importantes de la historia. Para ellos quizás era Kripke, para mi ya era Saul. Nos hubiera gustado celebrar juntos. Podría haber sido en Buenos Aires o en Nueva York. Lamentablemente, ya no podrá ser. Aunque también es cierto que esta sección temática es una manera de volver a reunirnos y de expresar el profundo agradecimiento que todos los integrantes del BA-Logic tenemos por Saul. Te vamos a extrañar… Ya te estamos extrañando…. (shrink)

This article develops a constructivist, non-metaphysical, non-essentialist conception of human dignity using Jeremy Waldron, Michael Rosen, Ernst Bloch, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. This constructivist conception of dignity is then related to the communicative or reflexive conception of freedom developed by discourse ethics. Then, these two conceptions are demonstrated to be foundational for the development and implementation of human rights.

ABSTRACT The article rereads Horkheimer and Adorno's classic Dialectic of Enlightenment from the standpoint of animal philosophy while also offering a comparison and contrast between Odysseus and Socrates as personifications of the “animal question” that haunts all Western philosophy. The key thesis is that this question is a metaphilosophical question and that we thus have to develop a critical philosophy that is at its core also an animal philosophy.

There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Patriotism is not commonly associated with freedom. Even less so when Hegel is evoked. By reading Hegel’s concept of patriotism through the lens of revolutionary France, I present a notion of patriotism that is tied to the realization of freedom. This paper demonstrates what happens when Hegel’s philosophy of law is re-read through the political philosophy of the French Revolution itself. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and its lectures are marked by tensions. The legacy it leaves traces it leaves behind can (...) be re-appropriated to explore the inconclusive hints left by the philosopher. The idea of patriotism is one of them, simply defined as an intersubjective link between the concrete individual and the state or as particular and general interests coinciding. This paper expands this analysis by introducing two elements: Hegel’s discussion on the character of the law and how it comes to be law; and the revolutionary phenomenon itself. The revolutionaries’ views on patriotism and its functions within a revolutionary moment can help us transform the mere traces left by Hegel into a wider vision that incorporates and promotes freedom. (shrink)

El artículo consiste en el estudio comparado de la ontología de Georg Simmel y de José Ortega y Gasset, con dos objetivos: demostrar la influencia de Simmel en la filosofía de Ortega, y exponer su ontología «comparada» como una crítica a la tradición parmenídea del ser. Para ello planteamos dos tesis de partida. La primera tiene que ver con el carácter vitalista de la filosofía de nuestros dos autores. En segundo lugar, la tesis de la «intradición de la tradición» como (...) mecanismo para estudiar la forma en que Simmel y Ortega recogen la tradición críticamente, a efecto de ajustarla a la «altura de su tiempo», según la terminología orteguiana. Finalmente, concluiremos con la idea de que la ontología de Simmel y Ortega es una crítica a la epistemología o a las implicaciones ontológicas de la epistemología moderna. (shrink)

Philosophy projects a certain understanding of reason that is related to the ways in which the city figures in its imaginary. Conversely, the city is a practice of spatialization that determines the ways in which agents are able, or unable, to live out their social agency. This essay focuses on the ways in which philosophy and the city's spatializing practices and imaginaries inform differential ways of living out social agency. The thrust of the investigation is to discern the ways in (...) which sexism - differential engendering - results from the relationship that exists between philosophy and the city. To illustrate this link between philosophy, the city, and differential engendering, the work turns to a consideration of Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenology, which is taken as an exemplary illustration of the entwinement between the philosophical imaginary, and the perception and reception of the city. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Comesaña's point of view on Putnam's model-theoretic argument. I claim that there is an interesting point made by the argument that Comesaña has not taken into account: if we want our semantic assertions to be at ali justified, the externalist claim according to which justification requires the God 's Eye View has to be given up.

How do scientists and theologians conceive new ways of mapping the world? Can parallels be found between the images they use, or the models they offer when new questions arise? I will explore Albert Einstein’s views on scientific imagination with the goal of contributing – at least within his own perspective – to answering these questions. Drawing on McGrath, I will first briefly describe Einstein’s desire for a unified vision of reality, the links between science and a ‘cosmic religion’, and (...) his overall ideas on transcendence. I will later further develop Einstein’s fundamental features of a cosmovision that grounds his work in physics, and encompasses his philosophical views on human existence and his general way of seeing the world. I will focus on Ideas and Opinions (1982), which will allow me to set the broad picture of his theory of everything and, at the same time, bring up the central aspects of Einstein’s ideas on the scientific imagination. Finally, I will briefly summarise my conclusions concerning Einstein’s views on the nature of scientific imagination as a mental device, especially regarding its twofold role in what I call ‘visual image play’ and conceptualization. (shrink)

This article discusses the fortuitous genesis of the book of my conversations with Angela Y. Davis, Abolition Democracy and traces some of the intellectual and philosophical sources that informed the specific questions and approaches that inform the dialogue. Davis’ relationships to Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, as well as to Foucault, are discussed. Similarly, Davis’ place within a critical black American political-philosophical tradition is analyzed. The essay focuses mainly, however, on the way in which Davis’ work on the prison industrial (...) complex profiles an unsuspected contribution to political philosophy that links up the disciplinary origins of American democracy with its racial contract to give rise to the prison contract. In the tradition of Charles Mills, Davis’ radical theory of penality unmasks and denounces the over-determined relationship between surplus punishment and the racial character of the US polity in terms of theproductivity of the prison system. (shrink)